Divided We Fall - Book Review

Divided We Fall is divided into three parts: a diagnosis of national polarization, a demonstration of the danger of polarization, and a solution to ameliorate national division.

Part I & II

David French’s diagnosis of American polarization is well-researched and certainly plausible. He argues that conflict is geographical – pointing to the divide between red and blue states with the (obvious) reason being that state sub-cultures are different and fueled by geographic separation. It is hard to deny that Los Angeles has vastly different sub-cultures than Dallas. Simple enough. Further, sub-cultures tend towards the general state culture (red or blue). This means that Californians (even gun-owning ones) will struggle to understand Tennessean gun culture, and Tennesseans (even pro-sanctuary state ones) will struggle to understand the extent of immigration sentiment pervading the Golden State.

This alone is not problematic for French. In line with the Founder’s tradition (Federalist No. 10 specifically), he recalls the Madisonian philosophy, “liberty is to faction as air is to fire” (Federalist No. 10). Faction is fine – it means liberty is in play. States can have groups of passionate people, even if they tend generally towards a side of the aisle.

However, French presses that general state factions have become unhealthy. Taking a lesson from the Civil War, he argues that modern state factions tend towards a factor that served to split the North and South during the mid-1800s: “an unreasonable fear of violence [of the other side]” (42). In the South's case, it was a fear of the North. Today, it is cast in terms of the right and left.

But French muses that both sides have a deeply radical and untrue view of each other which fuels this unreasonable fear. Partly due to mass media, people typically engage with the most extreme persons on each side (when each extreme side accounts for less than 10% of our national political makeup). The result: “We define ourselves by opposition. We’re united by loathing” (French 85).

For French, polarization has escalated to a boiling point. The window of acceptable dialogue has not shifted but split into two. There are now two Overton windows, one for the right and one for the left. Therefore, there is no dialogue since each side is dismissed as unacceptable. This is not just a left-leaning problem. When Kaepernick kneeled during the pledge of allegiance, the Republican party leader (Trump) went so far as to suggest that Kaepernick be discriminated against for his 1st amendment activity. What? How can he say this while in the same breath assuring pastors of religious freedom in the public square? This is not mere cognitive dissonance, but a deeper problem showing that the Overton window now forbids certain dialogue. Freedom of expression was stretched beyond the limits of Right's window. They missed the point because it was unacceptable.

So how do repair polarization? How to make our two windows into (at least) a Venn Diagram. French shows an abundance of wisdom at this point in the book. He accepts that readers on the Right and left will shut his diagnosis down as petty pandering to unify with enemies or try to blame the other side for polarization (and people still leave book reviews doing just that ha!). People are caught up in a will for power over solidarity. People will continue to insist that their political opponents are enemies. Both sides will turn a blind eye to the similarities and dismiss the other side. Thus, he prefaces that his solution will embody realism above the idyllic musing of most pundits.

But before presenting his solution, he provides some hypotheticals in part II that demonstrate the risks of polarization (national secession). For prolixity, these will not be discussed here since they merely establish his general point practically.

Review of Part I & II

I think part I is an excellent diagnosis of national partisanship. I would urge all readers to frequent his discussions on negative polarization.

However, I would have liked to see an analysis that deals with Republican/Democrat sentiment across state lines. Do Californian Republicans lean more left than Alabaman Republicans? Are the political emphases different or the same for each group across states? The general inquiry is whether regional polarization is as strong as national party polarization. If it turns out, for example, that a regional blueness bends the red opponents in that region towards the blue majority – that could be an interesting factor.

But overall, his discussion about the dual Overton Window in our politics was particularly illuminating. Truly, the quixotic cultural practices of one region are not even on the radar of far-off regions. But now people cast it existentially - everyone must culturally function in a way similar to their own. This was a point I was excited to see him address in his solution.

Before moving on to Part III, I want to discuss briefly one more point. Namely, how increasing emphasis on political identity exacerbates polarization. I cannot address this in depth due to prolixity, but find it to be a fruitful point. Namely, people come to see other people by partisan affiliation. This is such a demeaning aspect of polarization that has many implications - why have we allowed politics to transcend the deeper aspect of individuality? I encourage readers to check it out since I will not write on it.

Part III

Now we proceed to French's solution. Off the bat, French says some “no-no” words that many conservatives are sure to quickly dispel in one of their boring soap-box speeches about leftism. Indeed, too many book reviews have already done this. Instead, I hope we can take French's argument as he intends it and ignore the soapbox sonnet.

The first no-no word French drops on us is tolerance. Now, do not get me wrong, tolerance has been hijacked by many to mean “inclusivity for those whom I like.” But let us not get confused. French is not arguing for those wacky applications. Rather tolerance is

“respect or kindness for people toward people who are out of [my] group...[t]he word ‘tolerance’…implies that there is something to tolerate” (French 186).

If someone says something you do not like, you cannot shut them up or disrespect them as a person. It applies to "out-groups" and not "in-groups." The idea is simple but the application is lacking in our country.

But tolerance alone is not sufficient to solve the polarization. It is only the virtue that grounds a greater framework. Now we meet no-no word no.2: pluralism.

I can already hear the soapbox speeches in my ears. But on a second glance, these railings against tolerance express profound naivete toward French's idea. Pluralism is a fruit of the founding philosophy, an idea that conservatives can identify with and argue for within the tradition. It is nestled within the Madisonian way of thinking (Federalist No. 10). French is not reading a Kimberly Crenshaw essay to extrapolate this idea - he is reading the original framers. And he uses pluralism and tolerance to advance an extremely conservative, political mechanism: Madisonian federalism.

He emphasizes a return to a Madisonian, “healthy federalism.” He defines it as follows,

“Under healthy federalism, American citizens would enjoy guaranteed civil liberties that didn’t vary from state to state and they would enjoy a much greater degree of social control…public policy would be variable, customized for local interests” (215).

So, think of pre-civil war federalism minus slavery, religious establishment problems, discrimination against women, and other such issues that were later incorporated into the states with the 14th amendment. Essentially, states are in total control of all public policy outside the federal protection of individual rights and laws concerning such.

To exemplify, think of immigration policy. French discusses Arizona and California sanctuary state laws to illustrate the distinction. Both states advanced or inhibited the crackdown (respectively) against illegal immigration. When Arizona’s laws reached the supreme court, Kennedy (delivering the majority opinion) concluded that Arizona could not even make complementary policy to federal policy. In short, if AZ wanted to make laws that even complement federal priorities on immigration – suck it up – you cannot. This minimizes the role of the state outside of the Founding view for French and gives the federal government complete control over a matter that requires some social control.

French agrees with Scalia (who dissented in part). And presses that

“[t]he Founders recognized that America wasn’t a single sovereign entity but rather a unified nation comprising multiple districts and different states with their own sovereign interest” (220-21). The ultimate idea is that “[t]he federal government is supreme, but in the absence of conflict of federal law, the states have considerable discretion to fashion their own policies” (221).

Proper federalism would give discretion to the state for issues not relevant to the national legislature, to issues outside of the Constitutional guidelines.

Now blow this distinction up to any issue outside of federal control. This is the original, conservative idea. Localized social control with broad federal oversight of individual liberties. Sounds very neat in theory. My inner conservative impulse cannot help but smile. To exemplify again with immigration, one would not petition the federal government to change immigration law for the whole country, but only to their local government for their state. Beautiful. But French breaks the bad news,

“…a return to federalism is not on the table. The drive for domination is still too strong, and the hopes of domination are still high” (222).

So, how do we return to federalism if human nature is weak? French argues that it would take an extreme event that divorces federal involvement from localized issues. Of course, he places his bets on California. How?

If California goes through in creating a single-payer healthcare system (which he shows is extremely plausible), California could completely sever a tie between the federal government. Indeed, a single-payer system would diminish federal financial connections since the 200-billion-dollar Medicaid and Medicare premiums would no longer serve as federal revenue. This progressive move could shift the state to extensive self-governance, separating itself from the federal inquisition in healthcare.

French himself shudders at the thought of a single-payer system (and so do I, as a Californian) but the point still stands. This would be a separation from the government's social control in such an extreme way, that the federal government has no substantial recourse. California, with its robust economy and populace, is a state that could seriously tip the balance. And, French argues, once California does it, what is to stop everyone else? Precedent has been set – healthcare is localized – pandora’s box is fully open for stronger state governance for all social issues. From this, pluralism can thrive since California can do more (crazy) California things and the federal government is no longer a tool to infringe upon state governance. But this applies to all states. Tennessee too can do (less crazy) Tennessean things and so on.

In short, the Madisonian solutions of pluralism supplemented by political virtue of tolerance would require a strong assertion of state independence from government involvement in localized areas. This is the far-off oasis that French presents to our polarizing desert.

Review of Part III

I’ll admit, this is a creative solution (and super fun to think about). It outdoes much right-wing punditry that merely calls the U.S. to “love more,” “be better,” and essentially "hug it out with each other" by returning to a specific (polarized) way of thinking about things (as Shapiro does in his book about polarization). But I still find a return to Madisonian federalism impracticable. Really, on both the right and the left the federal government garnishes way more attention than localized government.

Indeed, there are many fruits of centralization we observe every election. To name a few, many have no idea who the local candidates are on the ballot, could not name their assembly representative, lieutenant governor, or even explain what a lieutenant governor does (this is California’s system). It would be funny if it were not so embarrassing. But this is the fruit of utilizing the federal government to solve all social problems. I repeat what I said earlier as well – it is an impulse the right indulges in (especially with its nationalist streak) just as much as the left. The Right just calls it a culture war. As Paul D. Miller says in his book,

“Culture war is only possible when Americans look to their government to establish a cultural template for the nation but disagree about what the template should look like” (Miller 108).

The right, like the left, is guilty of foisting a utopian template on the country. (For an argument why this is a bad thing and poor American philosophy – see Paul D. Miller's Religion of American Greatness).

But a state movement toward progressive healthcare is such a radical move. I want to believe French. But the impulse toward nationalism and extreme progressivism (both require top-down use of federal government) makes me doubtful of this return. Cynically, I hypothesize that people would simply sue California, using the Supreme Court to somehow strike down the progressive healthcare system, rejecting bids for Madisonian federalism. I struggle to find French's oasis practicable.

In terms of his two no-no words, I do not find pluralism (the second word) to be problematic. Having a pluralistic society is good, it means that a vast number of ideas, opinions, and doctrines are spread about for people to debate, comprehend, and reject – strengthening the mind and exploring natural law. J.S. Mill’s On Liberty (Chapters 2 and 4) has excellent arguments for how liberty that fosters a sort of pluralistic polity benefits even religious folk.

Further, most American Christianity partially owes some of its greatest theological contributions to a political environment that allowed disagreement from incorrect tradition (Nathan Hatch’s Democratization of American Christianity deals with this development well). Pluralism is not the problem, as French acknowledges, contemporary factionalism from polarization is the conundrum to solve. This is why he supplies tolerance as the political virtue necessary for pluralism. This is how he glues people together in a way conducive to the pluralistic vision.

But I would disagree with French that tolerance is the correct political virtue. Not because it is “a fruit from leftist ideas” (please, no soapbox sonnets), but because it demands too little of our citizenry. A society in which the polity is asked to merely tolerate each other sets the bar too low for civic virtue. I tend to agree more with Baron De Montesquieu (Spirit of Laws) that “a love for the Republic” ought to inform. Indeed, as Montesquieu argues, democracies are breeding grounds for virtuous engagement since the laws a person advocates for directly affect them. People are forced to “do unto others as you would have them do to you” (Luke 6:31). Every bad law one advocates for will come back to bite them in the butt too.

Tolerance is the wrong political virtue to supplement in light of the virtuous environment democracy has the potential to inhabit. But tolerance does not make use of this suitable environment. Instead, it places the individual in the center of the equation and makes other people an afterthought in the political processes.

When we are asked to tolerate someone, much is not required. Duties and obligations are cast in the negative – i.e do not kill, attack, or offend this person. No positive duties exist – i.e. what does this person need, how do I serve them, etc.

Friedrich Nietzsche argued that democracy would breed “little tyrants,” (Beyond Good And Evil 242) meaning that people will end up utilizing the system “for the people” to serve their greater inclinations to power and prestige (a concept developed in Reinhold Niebuhr’s Children of light et al. quite well). I think tolerance is the moral virtue that breeds this individual despotism. It allows one to display virtue without doing anything especially virtuous. One is rewarded for “not shouting down their opponent” when such should be the norm. We become little tyrants when democracy becomes about us as individuals. We try to game the system to suit our immediate passions. We should not allow the virtue of tolerance to be the moral dictate that grounds action - I think it would also work against French's pluralism eventually. We need something stronger as an ideal - even if it is not perfectly followed.

This is why I like Montesquieu's Love of Republic. It asks one to not only respect but serves their fellow citizens. As epitomized in the Christian ethic, love means stepping into the world of those who are your enemies (ahem: this is an implication from the doctrine of Christ’s incarnation). Tolerance, a contrario, means staying in your world and respectively viewing that which goes on around you. Problem is, if you do not relationally engage beyond the mere toleration of people, you risk alienating yourself from them altogether. This is a huge step towards polarization 0 one I think America took a while ago.

As you can see, this is a very underdeveloped idea in my thinking. Yet within it, one can see kernels of my quibbles with tolerance.

Overall, however, I recommend this book and think it is an excellent contribution to conservative literature. I think the underlying message further sounds the alarm about the American polarization problem and the dangers of leaving it unaddressed. His call to courage is something I will take to heart as I flee the toxic public discourse now accepted as normal among my fellow Americans.