Probably a Miracle? Review of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

The joy of reading Hume rests in his ability to arouse avidity in age-old, inchoate discussions of faith, reason, and experience. At the very least, his ideas ought to spur a mawkish unity of readers as we embark upon another exploration of our existence. Hopefully, we are brought together in our heuristic pursuits rather than pitted against each other in pure dogmatic indignation (though sometimes dogmatism is necessary).

But enough of the sentimentalism, what of Hume's enquiry is worth writing about?

As a background, Hume's epistemology is typically characterized as a mixture of indirect realism and skepticism. Though he asserts that our sensory faculties perceive real objects (outside of the mind), he also admits that it is not possible to rationally defend such assertion. This is because, as one commentator puts it, "in Hume's view...it is a mistake to demand rational justifications for all our beliefs; [for Hume,] many (perhaps all) of our beliefs are the product of ineradicable instincts, rather than reason" (Epistemology Contemporary Readings, Huemer 31). It is interesting to see his earlier discussion on experiences, customs, and inferences find coherency with these latter comments. It was provoking to think that our perceptions are copies of things we see, grounded in custom rather than reason. I found this observation fun to think about and provoking for discussion.

However, I was not impressed by his discussion on miracles since it neglects a proper, probabilistic calculus of miracles (obviously, Hume did not have contemporary probability formulations - so he receives some grace). Take the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth as an example. Many erudite Christian philosophers opine upon this in length, yet even a casual reader might notice that Hume, when discussing miracles, makes background experience more authoritative than in earlier chapters. Earlier, he insists that what we see as a cause is merely a conjoining of two events or a coincidence that we, through experience and custom, understand as a casual power. Would we not then be limited by that which is customary? Yet, when he talks about miracles, he establishes that, even with the limitation of experience, we are able to comprehend a uniformity in nature. Many have remarked that Hume "shoots himself in the foot" by making authoritative a method of reasoning he has given reason to cast doubt upon. However, Hume finds experience to be sufficient so much so that the uniformity of experience represents “a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of the miracle.” Men always die, therefore, there is proof against the fact that one lives. Further, for the testimony to be credible, it would have to be even more miraculous (contravening against uniform experience as well). Hume finds this to be self-defeating. After impugning the testimonies per se of those eyewitnesses, concluding that a more naturalistic explanation (such as they deluded themselves) is more probable based on those factors, Hume argues against a rational belief in miracles.

Aside from making background experience too weighty, Hume bypasses a proper probability calculation. Sure, our background experience may show a uniformity of nature, yet this neglects the discussion of the explanatory power of the resurrection hypothesis that involves God's existence (which Hume does not outright address here). If one denies/accepts God, they have to argue for such when considering the explanatory power of the resurrection hypothesis - to circumvent this would leave the discussion unfinished. In this proper analysis, Hume must further provide a coherent naturalistic account of this event that must be weighed against the hypothesis discussed above (think of this as the denominator "y" in a probability of "x/x+y"). It might be true that we have not experienced miracles in our background customs, but this does not deal with the specific evidence, the explanatory power of a certain hypothesis, or the validity of a naturalistic explanation. Hume's naturalistic explanation was that they were deluded, but does this explain the fact that the body of Jesus was never found when both Gentile authorities and Jews put him to death? If they were deluded, and both prevalent authorities had a hand in his death, why not parade his corpse around to make them see (as they did with other "Messiahs")?

If you find yourself answering that objection, then it shows that more discussion is needed for Hume's naturalistic explanation. It is, at best, incomplete. I was a but shocked at his somewhat fallacious attempt to impugn the credibility of the resurrection testimony because Second Temple Jews were, in his words, "barbaric". This sounds like a genetic fallacy and, though an interesting observation the early believers' psychology, is not sufficient to discredit their testimony.

Overall, this was a provoking book that helped me think deeper about my perception of the world. Though I find myself grappling against much of Hume's arguments, it has helped deepen my understanding of the difficulties in epistemology.